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Property institutions for rural land conservation: towards a post-neoliberal agenda 
 
 
Abstract 
The delivery of ecosystems services and conservation of biodiversity relies on the control of rural 
land for the provision of public benefits.  Much has been written about the progress of 
neoliberalisation, typically implying that land management decisions are increasingly being left to 
market forces.  However, less has been made of the areas in which the state has extended its control 
over land or where freehold rights have been attenuated.  At the same time, there are intimations 
that the neoliberal hegemony may be waning.  This paper explores approaches to the governance of 
rural land beyond the neoliberal agenda, drawing particularly on two cases: the proposals for the 
privatisation of the Public Forest Estate in England and the subsequent recommendations of an 
Independent Panel on Forestry, and the emergence of Large Conservation Area initiatives introduced 
by non-governmental organisations. It is important to recognise that the crafting of institutions 
determines the mix of private and public values of land and the incentives for management.  We 
focus particularly on three important elements of governance.  Institutional blending relates to the 
ways in which property rights area spread amongst different interested parties.  These arrangements 
identify the residual claimant that bears the risk and ultimate return from land holding.  Ultimate 
oversight of property use requires public trust to be identified.  Research is needed on the operation 
of these institutions in practice.  Governments will need to develop approaches to be able to define 
and promote public values in rural land uses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Neoliberalisation has brought about significant changes in the way nature is governed (Peck and 
Tickell 2002; McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Castree 2008) and in the way it is conserved (Hodge and 
Adams 2012, Büscher et al. 2012).  In particular, ecosystem services have become an increasingly 
important element in environmental policy, and of framing environmental management (Kosoy and 
Corbera 2010, Norgaard 2010).  The delivery and maintenance of ecosystem services relies 
substantially on the control and management of rural land.  This applies especially in the 
conservation of biodiversity and landscapes, where effective provision typically requires long term 
commitment to land uses that generate lower financial returns than are available through more 
market driven alternative uses and managements, and implementation at a scale that is typically 
greater than the areas of land under any single landownership.  Such provision is generally regarded 
as being for the public benefit and beyond the beyond the reasonable expectations of delivery by a 
private owner (Lockie, 2013).  In such a context, the conservation of rural landprovision may be 
implemented in various ways, including public ownership or payment of incentives to private owners 
by the state through some form of targeted payments for eco-system services (Kosoy and Corbera, 
2010) or agri-environment payments (Uthes and Matzdorf, 2013; Hodge, 20143).  However, such an 
approach faces a number of limitations (Hodge, 2001).  The delivery needs to be directed through 
some type of environmental contract that sets out the requirements and payments involved.  This 
creates problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, and inevitably cannot cover all possible 
contexts and contingencies.  Moreover, contracts are for a finite period of time and this creates 
uncertainty as to the capacity of the arrangement to deliver conservation benefits over the long 
term.  
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An alternative to the implementation of an environmental contract, or in parallel with it, is the 
potential for the development of alternative property arrangements over the land.  Alternatives to 
private, commercial landownership can address a variety of the limitations of environmental 
contracts.  The property owner, whether a public body or non-profit organisation, can share the 
public policy objectives that motivate the implementation of environmental contracts, while at the 
same time leaving the choice as to how best to deliver environmental benefits to the land owner/ 
manager on the ground.  The owner/ manager thus bears the opportunity costs of resource 
management decisions and in principle can select the socially optimal approach to delivery of the 
conservation objectives.   
 
The introduction of public or collective property ownership would appear to fly in the face of the 
current policy presumptions of neoliberalism that haves pushed back the realm of the state and 
expanded the role of the market.  In this paper we argue that neoliberalism has been less pervasive 
in terms of its influence over rural land and property relations in the UK than has generally been 
acknowledged in the literature (e.g. Harvey, 2005).  While neoliberalisation has been extensively 
discussed, particularly in the geographical literature, albeit recognising its complexities and internal 
inconsistencies, other disciplines, such as in environmental sciences or in law, have given greater 
emphasis to the expansion of the role of the state in regulating private interests and the socialisation 
of property relations.  There is also a discussion of the possibility of a ‘post-neoliberal’ era (e.g. Peck 
et al. 2010), and certainly neoliberalism continues to evolve, creating opportunities for private sector 
, government and civil society organizations to pursue their interests and agendas.  In this context, it 
is timely to review the possibility of alternative property arrangements that may be appropriate for 
the delivery of land conservation objectives in a world in which the policy assumptions and 
prescriptions being assumed are less dogmatic and more flexible.  Public policy towards rural land 
conservation and the management of rural places offers a particularly fruitful area for analysis, given 
the import ecosystem service benefits associated with alternative management arrangements and, 
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in the UK, the predominance of private land ownership. In the past, government influence over rural 
land management has been limited to that achieved through public ownership and regulation.  The 
introduction of new policy approaches over the past thirty years has expanded the capacity of 
government to promote rural land conservation over a majority of the rural land area.   
 
In Section 2 we outline the contested nature of neoliberalism and some alternative perspectives 
from other disciplines.  We then argue in Section 3 that neoliberal institutional mechanisms have the 
potential to enable and expand state influence over rural land conservation. In Section 4 we 
introduce two cases that have informed our thinking about the potential property institutions: the 
plans to sell the Public Forest Estate and the adoption of Large Conservation Areas.  The 
requirement to craft institutional arrangements to reflect particular contexts and determine values 
is introduced in Section 5.  We then discuss three key elements in institutional development: 
institutional blending, the residual claimant and public trust.  Finally, we draw some conclusions in 
Section 6.  
 
2. Intimations of post-neoliberalism 
 
The neoliberal project has been a major focus for public policy around the world for the past quarter 
of a century, spreading from the early doctrines of monetarism and privatisation, through to a 
plethora of forms of neoliberalism.  Harvey (2005, p.2) comments that neoliberalism is “in the first 
instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be 
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade”.   
 
A key argument at the micro level is that privately owned firms operate so as to maximise efficiency.  
The decisions within the firm will ultimately be directed by the residual claimant who receives the 
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net returns and bears the residual risk arising from the activity of the firm represented by the net 
cash flows, the difference between the stochastic inflows of resources and the promised payments 
to agents (Fama and Jensen, 1983b).  The owner as the residual claimant will have a clear incentive 
to maximise the difference between cost and returns and to monitor employees’ behaviour in order 
to promote this objective.  She will select amongst the institutional arrangements available within 
the firm, contracts with external agents or market operations in order to make the best use of the 
firm’s capacity and resources.  Efficiency will be driven by competition in markets for inputs and 
outputs, obliging firms to be sensitive to customer preferences and to finding cost effective 
production methods.  Inefficient firms will be at a disadvantage, losing market share or facing 
potential bankruptcy or takeover by competing managers who can make better uses of the firm’s 
assets.  Under neoliberal governancement, these same arguments are deployed to the management 
of public bodies.  In the United Kingdom tThere was a resurgence of interest in privatisation under 
the incoming Conservative/Liberal Ddemocrat government in 2010, notably in the context of 
forestry.  However, the debate about privatisation differed from the debate that was prevalent 
when the Conservatives were previouslylast in power in the early 1990s.  While there is evidence 
that privatisation can in certain circumstances improve the performance of economic activity, it is 
increasingly disliked by the public, potentially because the potential benefits have been oversold by 
governments (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004).  The beneficial effects of privatisation are essentially 
dependent on the introduction of effective competition in product and capital markets (Kay and 
Thompson, 1986; Vickers and Yarrow, 1991) and t.   This does not rely especially on the ownership of 
the assets (Letza et al., 2004).   
 
Similar arguments apply to the conservationownership of rural land.   Demsetz (1967) argues for the 
superiority of private property rights in land ownership in promoting efficiency. But even Adam 
Smith, the icon of liberalism, recognised a role for public landownership.  He was concerned that the 
Crown owned substantial areas of land but that these were poorly managed and failed to deliver as 
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much revenue as they should do.  He comments that “When the crown lands had become private 
property, they would, in the course of a few years, become well-improved and well-cultivated” 
(Smith, 1776, p. 421).  However, he recognised that this not would not apply to all land.  “Lands, for 
the purposes of pleasure and magnificence, parks, gardens, public walks, &c. possessions which are 
everywhere considered as causes of expense, not as sources of revenue, seem to be the only lands 
which, in a great and civilised monarchy, ought to belong to the Crown” (p. 422).  This suggests that, 
in his view, rural land used for the provision of public goods might be kept under public ownership.   
 
The contested and contradictory character of neoliberalism is well recognised.  The scope of 
neoliberalisation has been extended to embrace a complex of policy directions (McCarthy and 
Prudham, 2004, Peck and Tickell, 2002) and is not homogenous or universal (Castree 2008).  More 
straightforward developments of privatisation, including ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ (deregulation and 
dismantling of the activities of the state) or ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ (regulatory reform and 
reconstruction of the state around neoliberal models) have been succeeded by further elaborations, 
some involving an increased degree of state intervention. Harvey (2005) recognises the internal 
contradictions where the neoliberal state “is itself forced to intervene, sometimes repressively, thus 
denying the very freedoms it is supposed to uphold” (p. 69).  Sandberg and Wekerle (2010, p. 53) for 
instance, in the discussion of the conservation of rural land in Ontario, comment that “command and 
control measures can serve neoliberal processes”, arguing that such a “roll out regulatory measure” 
in the Oak Ridges Moraine “supports privatisation and marketization”.  While McCarthy (2005) 
characterises the development of community forestry as ‘hybrid neoliberalism’, Cole (2002) 
characterises the similar development of land trusts in terms of ‘publicization’.  Further, as Dempsey 
and Robertson (2012) argue, policies and practices have deviated considerably from neoliberal 
doctrine.  With “an almost bewildering array of local trajectories, contingent forms and hybrid 
trajectories”, Peck et al. (2010) ask whether we are entering a post-neoliberal world.  Given these 
complexities and contradictions, we have explored elsewhere the possibility for an alternative 
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institutional approach that we term ‘institutional blending’ that recognises the variety and 
complexity inherent in developing analysis of property and environmental management, without the 
prior implicit or explicit assumptions about a government’s core values and objectives (Hodge and 
Adams, 2012).  Choices as to the appropriate arrangements for the governance of rural land raise a 
set of issues concerning the reallocation of property rights between agents, decomposing and 
recomposing the bundles of rights held by alternative types of agent, the development of new types 
of organisations and partnerships to hold and control property rights and co-ordinate decisions, 
especially non-profit and collective, and engineering alternative internal governance arrangements 
to reflect those collective interests in terms of the ways in which resources are controlled and used.  
More recently, the changed state of the global economy generally and the widespread financial crisis 
in particular have demonstrated the capacity of the state to put market principles aside and to re-
introduce substantial levels of public ownership (Peck, et al. 2010;, Cumbers, 2012).  These changes 
might be seen as presaging a more fundamental development in policy flexibility; a period that we 
may refer to as post-neoliberalism.   
 
At the same time, other authors have argued that there have been countervailing forces that have 
significantly expanded the areas of public influence and control in the rural environment, even 
through the height of neoliberalisation.  Everard (2011) in particular argues that the 20th Century 
represented a period over which the commons were substantially reclaimed for the public interest. 
He comments (p. 150) that the “recognition and progressive safeguarding of the public value of land, 
water and ecosystem services expanded significantly throughout the twentieth century”.  Some of 
this came prior to the era of neoliberalism, particularly in the seminal legislative innovations in mid 
century, and some has been implemented through the provision of payments, such as for agri-
environment schemes, forestry management or renewable energy, that have left landholders’ 
property rights unconstrained.  But much too has been implemented through the attenuation of 
private property.   
Comment [BA1]: This feels as if we are 
advocating it in practice – I feel more as if 
we have said it is happening.  This is a 
move that we should probably make. 
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In this vein, lawyers have pointed to the erosion of the rights of freehold property owners that have 
weakened private property rights.  Lacy and Mitchell (1996) for instance regard freehold ownership 
to have been sufficiently diluted to the extent that they argue that it might better be regarded as 
land stewardship.  Rights of landowners have been restricted, inter alia, in support of the common 
interest in water and air quality, conservation of biodiversity and landscape, in protecting the 
historic and urban and landscapes, in mitigating emissions of greenhouse gases, and in promoting 
public access to private land.  Advances have been made in attenuating private property in the 
collective interest in all of these areas in the period since the mid 1980s.  Pascoe (2012) discusses 
the ‘erosion of land ownership’ focussing on the obligations to allow access to countryside and coast 
under the Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000 and the Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, 
the ban on hunting wild mammals with dogs in England and Wales under the Hunting Act, 2004, and 
the introduction of Empty Dwelling Management Orders under the Housing Act, 2004.  But a wide 
range of other types of erosion of private property in land might have been noted, such as 
represented by the introduction of restrictions over agricultural practices to reduce water pollution 
in Nitrate Vulnerable Zones, the enforcement of restrictions without compensation in the 
management of Sites of Special Scientific Interest, the introduction of limits over development 
within National Parks, conditions imposed over forestry operations subject to approval by the 
Forestry Commission, or the introduction of requirements for Environmental Assessment. 
 
In a notable change in property relations, the past century has seen a steady shift towards the 
formalisation and enhancement of the public’s right of access across private property.  In England 
and Wales, this arises fromis reflected in the 1949 National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 
and the 2000 Countryside and Rights of Way Act.  In Scotland in particular access to the countryside 
has been widened under the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, but by adopting a novel approach 
(Rowan-Robinson, 2003).  The new legislationi establishes a general right of access to all land for 
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recreational purposes, for relevant educational activity or to cross the land.  The right may be 
exercised on foot, on horseback, on bicycle or in a boat or canoe.  Certain areas of land are excluded, 
such as buildings and their curtileges, land required for adequate privacy for dwellings and land on 
which crops are growing, although even here access rights do extend to field margins or orchards.  
Access is permitted to sports fields and golf courses provided that it does not interfere with sporting 
use.  But a key feature is that access must be exercised ‘responsibly’, in such a way as “not to cause 
unreasonable interference with any of the rights (whether access rights, rights associated with the 
ownership of land or any others) of any other person”. At the same time, the Act imposes a duty on 
land owners to use and manage their land and otherwise conduct their ownership in a way that is 
‘responsible’.  They will be presumed to achieve this if they do not cause unreasonable interference 
with the access rights of those exercising them (Lovett, 2011).  The flexibility in the legislation and 
reliance on good behaviour leaves many issues ill-defined and open to interpretation that has to be 
provided through case law.  But the approach undoubtedly represents a substantial and rather 
open-ended interference with the right of a landowners to exclude others from their property.  Gray 
(2010) refers to these sorts of developments in public access rights as “quantum steps on the road 
toward pedestrian democracy” (p. 63).  The Scottish government has also pushed back the role of 
the state in other ways, especially by promoting the social ownership of land by communities  (e.g. 
Warren and McKee, 2011; Hoffman, 2013). 
 
These examples suggest that the pattern of change in the governance of land has been more diverse 
than is sometimes implied, notwithstanding the recognition of the complexities within neoliberalism. 
 
2.1 The opportunities of neoliberal mechanisms 
 
Without needing to pass judgement on the overall implications of the neoliberal programme or 
rehearsing the critiques, we do argue that it has opened out the range of mechanisms that are 
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available for state guidance of land and resource management.  It has emphasised the spectrum of 
potential ownership arrangements between pure state ownership and profit driven private 
ownership.  The more flexible approach towards governance through contracts or partnership 
arrangements allows both public and private bodies to tailor motivations and incentives towards 
specific circumstances.  Incentives can be guided through such mechanisms as environmental 
contracts, transferrable permits, covenants or offsetting.  The rigours of competitive processes can 
be turned towards the promotion of greater cost-effectiveness in pursuit of public policy objectives.  
Such arrangements can be adopted in co-ordinating land use decisions across larger areas of land.  
Policy objectives that could only have been approached through the outright acquisition and 
management of land by government in pre-neoliberal times can now be pursued through 
environmental contracts or indirectly through intermediary organisations, such as conservation 
trusts.  There is a very real sense in which the potential for the public to recapture the commons has 
been facilitated by the institutional mechanisms pioneered through neoliberalisation.   
 
3. Two emergent cases 
 
The application of these opportunities can be assessed in the context to two significant 
developments in rural land conservation in the United KingdomGreat Britain: the debate as to the 
potential privatisation of the Forestry Commission Estate in England and the development of Large 
Conservation Areas.  In both cases, we consider the opportunity for a comprehensive re-assessment 
of the institutional arrangements for the management of forested and conservation land and the 
role for public trust in providing oversight and guarantee for public stewardship values.  
 
3.1 The Public Forest Estate in England 
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Towards the end of 2010, the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government indicated that 
it was minded to privatise the Public Forest Estate (PFE) in England (Hodge and Adams, 2013a).  This 
proposal promoted a vigorousmajor public response in favour of the retention of the estate in public 
ownership; in an opinion poll, 84% agreed that woods and forests should be kept in public 
ownership for future generationsii and well over half a million people signed a petition demanding 
that the government “Save our forests – don’t sell them off to the highest bidder”iii.  Arguably, the 
vehemence of the public reaction against the sale of the PFE might be attributed to the sort of issue 
that Sagoff (1988) characterises as a category mistake.  The initial proposal for the privatisation of 
the Public Forest Estate appears to have been motivated by a general sense in the new coalition 
government that the private sector can perform better than the public sector and a requirement for 
government to raise public funds at a time of financial crisis iv.  The problem was cast by government 
in terms of finding the best means of delivering economic benefits from forests, recognising that 
some of them have public good characteristics and more generally, that the government has 
adopted an ecosystems services approach towards the natural environment (DefraEFRA, 2011), 
emphasising the identification, valuation and effective commoditisation of ecosystem services (UK 
NEA, 2011).   In contrast, the public saw the issue of forest ownership as a matter of principle, of 
values rather than preferences (Sen, 1977), so that the question perceived by the public was not 
primarily to identify a cost-effective form of delivering services, but rather to maintain the ‘right’ 
form of governance. 
 
As a consequence of this reaction, the government curtailed the public consultation exercise and 
appointed an Independent Panel to undertake a wider review of forestry policy.  After further 
consultation and review, in its final report, the Independent Panel on Forestry (2012) concluded that 
forestry and woodland were greatly undervalued and that that the area of woodland in England 
should be expanded from its present 10% of the land area to 15% by 2060. They also recommended 
that the PFE should remain in public ownership.  They proposed that the estate should be treated as 
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land “held in trust for the nation” whose management would be overseen by ‘Guardians’ or 
‘trustees’ who would be directly accountable to Parliament.  These recommendations were 
subsequently almost entirely accepted by government (DefraEFRA, 2013).   As a consequence of this 
reversal of policy,  the government has failed to extend the degree to which the delivery of forest 
services has been commodified as had initially been intended. 
 
3.2 The control of land for Large Conservation Areas 
 
The second case that has informed our thinking relates to the development of initiatives for large 
scale conservation in Britain (Macgregor et al., 2012;, Adams, 2012;, Adams et al.; 2013).  Ecological 
science has increasingly emphasised the limits of wildlife conservation focussed on relatively small 
isolated sites and advocated approaches implemented at a larger scale.  This ‘landscape’ or 
‘ecological network’ approach was been stressed in an influential report by Lawton et al. (2010) and 
subsequently sanctioned by a government White Paper (Defra, 2011).  The redirection of policy 
signalled in the White Paper followeding a number of major initiatives for large scale conservation 
already being introduced by conservation NGOs. These initiatives represent a substantial expansion 
of the scale and ambition for wildlife conservation (Adams et al. 2013).  The delivery of conservation 
objectives through the direct engagement of non-profit organisations introduces new actors into 
land management and offers a means of generating conservation values or ecosystems services with 
less reliance on the commodification of these values through the implementation of environmental 
contracts or markets. 
 
A great diversity of large conservation areas exists.  Macgregor et al. (2012) recognise several 
categories: first, conservation areas with a single landowner, such as private estates or owned 
nature reserves; second, conservation areas or projects involving a small number of landowners as 
active partners (for example managing neighbouring properties in a unified way); third, the areas 
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within which government environmental farming schemes are targeted (e.g. Higher Level 
Stewardship or Catchment Sensitive Farming); fourth, multi-landowner projects where many 
property owners and managers come together.  Most of the major conservation NGOs in the UK 
have LCA programmes. The National Trust launched the Wicken Fen Vision project in 1999, the RSPB 
first proposed ‘Futurescapes’ in 2001 (relaunching the programme in 2010, RSPB, 2010) and The 
Wildlife Trusts launched its ‘Living Landscapes’ programme in 2005 (Wildlife Trusts, 2011).  Other 
organisations include the Woodland Trust (2002) , Butterfly Conservation (Ellis et al., 2012), John 
Muir Trust, Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust, National Trust for Scotland and the, Woodland Trust).  
 
A survey in 2011 identified somefound a total of 244 large conservation projects across the UK 
(Elliott et al. 2011): Of these, 72% were in England, 19% in Scotland, 6% in Wales and 2% in Northern 
Ireland.  The number of Scottish projects was almost certainly underestimated.  LCAs rely heavily on 
the development of partnerships amongst a variety of different types of landowner. Partner 
organizations include individual landowners (ranging from large estates to small farms or other 
owners), various forms of charity, trust or non-governmental organization, research institutions, 
Local Authorities (County or District Councils), government bodies (national conservation agencies), 
and private companies (utilities, mining companies, transport infrastructure). Some initiatives are 
built on existing partnerships, and indeed on existing landholdings by the lead organisation (e.g. 
RSPB Futurescapes or Wildlife Trusts Living Landscapes that are centred on existing nature reserves 
held by these NGOs).  Other partnerships are newly created, for example the Clyde and Avon Valley 
Landscape Partnership, which is led by the South Lanarkshire Council with nine partners (Scottish 
National Heritage, Scottish Wildlife Trust, RSPB, North Lanarkshire Council, Clydesdale Community 
Initiatives, Rural Development Trust, New Lanark Trust, Central Scotland Forest Trust and the 
Forestry Commission).   
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The core feature of LCAs is the attempt to co-ordinate the management of rural land at a larger scale 
than has been practiced or indeed generally possible since the substantial demise of the great 
landed estates early in the 20th century (Thompson, 1963).  Various different approaches have been 
used to achieve this, ranging from informal understandings amongst the parties involved to the 
creation of independent legal bodies.  The whole movement is substantially funded through the 
operation of agri-environment schemes and, to a lesser extent, other public grants.  The initiatives 
are thus vulnerable under present arrangements to changes in other relatively unrelated policy 
regimes, especially the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy, and dependent on the resilience 
of the institutional arrangements under which they are operated (Adams et al., 2013).  
 
 
4. Crafting alternative institutional arrangements 
 
The challenges of neoliberalism have not reignited faith in traditional forms of public provision.  
Decisions taken by politicians are also regarded with suspicion and a degree of dissatisfaction on 
account of the short term and party political nature of many political motivations.  This is an 
example of the ‘post-political’ where “an elite is charged with making decisions that are removed 
from, but seen as being on behalf of, the rest of us” (Cumbers, 2011, p. 93).  The Independent Panel 
on Forestry (2012) comments on the need for “freedom from short-term political interference to 
take a balanced and impartial view of the distribution of resources and benefits across the estate ... 
accountable to Parliament rather than Ministers with a clear long-term Charter and funding”.  Of 
course this may still be vulnerable to capture by some other interests and this remains a 
responsibility of Parliament by some means or other.  There is thus a search for alternative forms of 
governance that provide space for competing interests to negotiate approaches towards rights and 
duties and land management objectives.   
 
15 
 
Establishing appropriate governance is thus more about crafting institutions for particular social 
objectives in particular placescircumstances than it is about privatisation or neoliberalisation.  Vatn 
(2005, p. 203) argues that “the core policy issue is to determine which institutional frameworks are 
most reasonable to apply to which kinds of problem”.  From a social constructivist perspective, 
choices reflect the norms, rules and expectations as reflected in the institutions of a society.  
“Common knowledge in the form of concepts or typifications of both natural and social phenomena 
constitutes the basis for creating necessary meaning and order so that cooperation becomes 
possible” (p. 206, italics in original).  The sharing of a common acceptance, or typification, makes it 
an institution influencing values and decisions.   
 
Thus for instance, in the case of the debate about the sale of the Public Forest Estate, it is plausible 
to argue that there was a conflict between the market oriented rationality of the government in its 
proposal to sell the public forests and the apparent rights based rationality presumed for the role of 
the public forests by the public.  The process of public debate and the 42,000 submissions made to 
the Independent Panel on Forestry may be seen as a process of formulating or typifying the issue for 
the process of policy formulation.  There is a parallel here with respondents’ reactions against the 
commodification implicit in an economic valuation of lowland heath on the grounds that they 
believed that the heaths ‘should’ be common land (Spash and Hanley, 1995).   
 
Institutions also influence valuations.  Vatn (2005, p. 211) defines value articulating institutions as a 
constructed set of rules or typifications.  Thus different institutions will give different outcomes or 
solutions.  In the context of the provision of unpriced public good outputs or ecosystem services, the 
weight given to the alternative outputs will reflect the influence that different interests have in the 
decision-making processes of the organisation managing the land.  The governance arrangements 
for the management of particular rural areas will then influence the management decisions arrived 
at and the balances selected between alternative private and public goods, or ecosystem services.  
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This institutional context will also influence the way in which those affected, whether in working for 
organisations or as visitors, respond to the opportunities available to them.  For instance, voluntary 
organisations may help to crowd in pro-social behaviour or mitigate agency problems arising in 
commercial firms.  At the same time, recall that market incentives under competition can also act to 
improve motivations and promote cost-effectiveness.  There is thus a balance to be struck and 
different governance arrangements are likely to be appropriate in different contexts. 
 
5. Three key dimensions of property relations 
 
In what follows we concentrate on three key aspects of institutional arrangements: institutional 
blending, the residual claimant and the maintenance of public trust.  These reflect the ways in which 
property rights are allocated amongst interested actors, the incentives facing actors and 
organisations directly responsible for the management of the land, and the ultimate duty towards 
long-term stewardship resting with the state. 
 
5.1 Institutional blending 
 
We have defined institutional blending elsewhere in terms of recomposing property, assigning 
property rights, developing partnership arrangements and engaging with non-profit organisations 
(Hodge and Adams, 2012).  Rural land generates a variety of outputs and ecosystem services with 
different degrees of public interest and recognised as havingbeing of differing degrees of 
significance. The Millennium Assessment (MA, 2005) distinguished provisioning, regulating, cultural 
and supporting services, but these are highly interdependent and vulnerable to double counting 
(Fisher and Turner, 2008). The UK National Ecosystem Assessment (2011) distinguishes between 
final ecosystem services that directly involve provision of good and benefits to society, and the 
underpinning ecological services within ecosystems. Ecosystem processes such as nutrient cycling or 
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pollination give rise to final ecosystem services (crops, trees, flood regulation), and in turn to goods 
(cereals, meat, timber, and wildlife valued as a cultural service, Mace et al. 2011).  The ability of 
private landowners and public to gain from goods produced by ecosystem services (crops, 
landscape, biodiversity, water conservation, heritage conservation and public access) varies.  One 
approach to the question of governance is to consider what type of ownership is most likely to lead 
to an outcome that in some way reflects wider public interests.  There are a number of options 
relating both to the type of owner and the period of time over which it applies: 
 State ownership, directly managed or with activities contracted out, 
 Private for-profit ownership, freehold or leasehold, subject to regulations with potential for 
contracting for the provision of public goods, 
 Non-profit ownership, freehold or leasehold, subject to regulations with potential for 
contracting for the provision of public goods. 
 
The appropriate arrangements are likely to involve some blend of the institutional options reflecting 
the circumstances of particular land areas.  In principle the institutional structure should be designed 
to address the most important decisions relating to selection of outputs and methods of production.  
Table 1 indicates some of the more important factors. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
There will also be an optimal institutional intensity of governance.  More complex governance 
arrangements or engagement with larger numbers of stakeholders in more detailed ways clearly 
increase the transactions costs of governance.  It may be expected that more complex governance 
can improve the quality or representativeness of decisions taken or reduce agency problems but 
only by increasing the transactions costs.  There is thus likely to be a trade-off between the efficiency 
(or ‘precision’, Vatn, 2002) of the management processes and the transactions costs.  Lighter touch 
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governance will be preferred where the management options are few or the value of the outputs is 
relatively low. 
 
Achieving the necessary management requirements over larger areas of land for wildlife 
conservation is less about the ownership of the land and more about the means by which groups of 
owners of different types can work in partnership.  Different types of organisations can play to their 
individual strengths; non-profits may lever in donations or voluntary labour, or commercial 
organisations may operate profit-making ventures that can generate funds to cross-subsidise other 
aspects of the work.  Neoliberal mechanisms offer some organisations a means whereby they can 
influence land management beyond any property that they own themselves without the cost and 
responsibilities of freehold land ownership.   
 
 
At its most simple, this can involve advice and guidance, possibly supplemented by financial or other 
support.  Such arrangements are common in large conservation areas, where for example the key 
plank of work by Butterfly Conservation is helping farmers apply for agri-environment support that 
will favour butterflies and moths (Ellis et al., 2011).  Beyond this, there can be written agreements 
between landowners in the form of environmental contracts or covenants (Law Commission, 2013) 
for land to be managed in particular ways.  An example of this might be the Marlborough Downs 
Nature Improvement Area (NIA) on Salisbury Plain, which is a collaboration among a set of 
neighbouring farmers to win funds from the £7.5 million available from DefraEFRA as seed funds to 
support twelve projects ‘restoring and connecting nature on a significant scale’ (DefraEFRA, 2011a, 
p. 21). Partnerships may be fully formalised in legal terms through the creation of a separate, 
independent organisation to take control of the project.  Such organisations have been established 
for example in order to govern the implementation of agri-environment projects (Franks and Emery, 
2013). 
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5.2 The residual claimant 
 
The changes inse governance arrangements being introduced in the Public Forest Estate and in LCAs 
will alterdetermine the identity, and character and incentives of the residual claimant.  The residual 
claimant is generally the agent that holds property rights over the assets of an organisation.  In the 
case of a non-profit organisation, there are no agents with alienable rights to residual net cash flows 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a p. 318) and thus, in that sense no residual claimants. However that does 
not mean that there are no residual risks, rather the risks are borne by consumers or the 
beneficiaries of the non-profit’s activities and by the factors used to produce the outputs (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b).  Enjolras (2009) differentiates residual claims between residual control and residual 
income. In effect, inalienable residual claims are vested in a board of trustees and net cash flows are 
committed to current and future output (Fama and Jensen, 1983b, p. 348).  Speckbacher (2008 p. 
305) comments that “residual rights of control include the right to interpret its mission and turn it 
into something more concrete by formulating organisational objectives, the right to specify how this 
mission is best realized and the right to make all management decisions”.  In practice, some of these 
rights will be delegated.  
 
However, the residual claimant’s objectives will never match perfectly with an ‘ideal’ public interest, 
whether the property is owned by a private, state or non-profit organisation.  The approaches 
adopted by any of them will be influenced by the incentives within the organisation, legal 
constraints and government policy.  And particularly, the agency problem is still present in non-
profits.  Donors will only contribute to a non-profit organisation if they have confidence that the 
funds will be well spent towards the objectives of the organisation as a whole.  The risk that 
donations will simply be directed towards increased returns to shareholders will undermine the 
potential for donations to for-profit organisations.  The absence of residual claimants to cash flows 
20 
 
avoids the problem of the advantages attained through the donations to an organisation being 
siphoned off to the residual claimants (Fama and Jensen 1983b), but the non-profit still faces agency 
problems in that the objectives of those working in it will not align completely with the objectives of 
the organisation.  This is addressed by the separation of management (initiation and 
implementation) and control (ratification and monitoring) (Fama and Jensen, 1983b, p.344).  
Voluntary organisations may be either membership organisations or board-managed.  In either case, 
there will be a board of directors or trustees who take oversight of the operation of the organisation.   
The board of directors or trustees holds the power to monitor and ratify important decisions and to 
hire and determine the employment conditions of senior staff.  At the same time, while the board 
are likely to have limited liability and be unpaid, they are still likely to face penalties if the 
organisation is improperly run or trades while in a state of insolvency.  There is thus a clear incentive 
for directors to monitor and ensure at least the probity of the operation. 
 
In determining the objectives and general strategy for the organisation, the board will take account 
of the full range of benefits generated by its activities.  In a private firm, the board will seek to 
maximise the value of the financial return that can be paidreturned to the shareholders.  In a non-
profit the purpose of the organisation is to make the best use of the resources available in order to 
deliver the organisation’s mission.  Of course, there may well be financial returns from some of the 
organisation’s activities, but these will be directed towards the further enhancement of its primary 
goal.  Thus the organisation has the capacity to use its resources in generating financial returns and 
to act entrepreneurially where this has the potential advance its mission.  Generally, the closer is the 
organisation’s mission to government policy the more likely is the organisation to maximise the 
social value of the assets under its control.  In this way, appropriately designed institutions offer an 
alternative to public policy implemented through the use of economic valuation and incentives 
provided to private profit-oriented firms. 
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In the case of the governance of a forest that has the potential to generate a range of ecosystem 
services with public good characteristics, a guiding principle will be to seek a residual claimant whose 
valuation of the non-market outputs is most similar to the social value.  This effectively internalises 
the externalities and will establish incentives for their cost-effective provision.  The residual claimant 
may then choose to contract out certain operations, such as harvesting, if they can be performed 
more cost-effectively by another organisation, or work in partnership if that offers potential 
advantages, such as in providing recreation facilities that depend on the way in which the forest is 
being managed.  
 
The identity of the residual claimant in the governance arrangement proposed by the Independent 
Panel on Forestry may need to be clarified.  The proposed arrangement (Independent Panel on 
Forestry, 2012, Figure 12) sets the Guardians, an Independent Board of Trustees, to operate under a 
Charter for the English Public Forest Estate, under the UK Parliament.  The management is 
undertaken by an English forest management organisation.  Presumably in this, the Guardians 
represent the residual claimant, in which case they will need to have the sort of immediate 
involvement in management that a Board of Directors could be expected to have over a public 
limited company.  Otherwise the ultimate responsibility for management might be accepted neither 
by the forest management organisation nor by the Guardians.  The creation of distance between the 
forest management and the sponsoring government department (currently the Department of 
Environment Food and Rural Affairs) that will still be expected to provide funding may act to weaken 
the commitment that government feels for the promotion of forestry.  This may already be signalled 
in the Government’s response to the Independent Panel’s report when it comments that it expects 
over time that the forest management can become more financially independent.  The government 
comments “We will give it greater freedom to achieve a sustainable financial position and manage 
its resources to best effect within a clear long-term remit to maintain and enhance the land, trees 
and other assets under its care. …. The Government will support the new body to the level required 
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to secure its long-term success, but has a clear expectation that it should become as financially self-
sustaining as possible over time” (DefraEFRA, 2013 pp. 26-7).  A government committed to reducing 
public expenditure may see this as offering a rationale for cutting back. 
 
There is an issue here too about the direction of management of the PFE in the longer term, 
notwithstanding the requirement for the Guardians to look after the estates for future generations.  
The priorities for forest management have changed fundamentally more than once in the history of 
the Forestry Commission and there are no reasons why they should not change again.  The 
maintenance of public ownership and oversight retains the capacity for similar changes into the 
future, well beyond the immediate interests of the current generation.  This applies not just to the 
immediate outputs of the forest management organisations, but also to the continuing 
appropriateness of the governance arrangements under different circumstances in the future.  
 
The closeness of the Board to direct political control will depend on whether the estate may be seen 
to be better managed by ‘political’ as opposed to ‘stakeholder’ interests.  This question here is how 
such a shift of priorities would be identified and implemented.  Is this a responsibility of the 
Guardians or would it require some amendment of the Charter, presumably by Parliament?  The 
challenge will arisebe when demands for a change of direction reflect political pressures outwith the 
remit identified by the Charter that the Guardians may see as inappropriate.  This would presumably 
have to be resolved through the government persuading Parliament to alter the Charter or else to 
change the composition of the Board of Guardians.  
 
There is a further question as to whether a national body can be effectively responsive to localised 
preferences and contexts.  This follows from the failure to explore the possibility for institutional 
diversity across different local forests in the debate about forest sales.  We may identify four 
potential archetypal governance arrangements that could suite different forestry contexts (Hodge 
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and Adams, 2013a): commercial forests, forests of major conservation value, local community 
woodlands, and forests of scientific importance facing uncertainty and irreversibility. But the 
potential for a diversity of options was apparently not explored in detail by the Independent Forestry 
Panel. Nevertheless there may be an argument for some hierarchy in the governance arrangements, 
perhaps establishing regional boards with responsibility of oversight and guidance at a regional level.  
There may be potential gains to be had through co-ordination of the management of forests at some 
spatial scale with regard to recreation provision, biodiversity conservation or timber supply.  But 
here too, there will be a balance between the increased level of transactions costs and the marginal 
increase in the value of the benefits obtained by more complex governance arrangements.  But this 
takes us back to what we see as the missed opportunity to craft governance arrangements more 
specifically to differing local circumstances.   
 
In the context of LCAs, the identity of the residual claimant will depend on the formal arrangements 
for the control of the land in the area.  This will usually remain with the individual landholders and so 
the partnership will have to work with the divergent interests and incentives of the separate 
partners.  This is the model adopted by most LCAs, which are based on more or less of informal 
working relationships, often between partners of very different kinds and capacities.  The main 
exceptions to this are projects brought together in applying for specific funds (e.g. the Clyde Valley 
Partnership in Lanarkshire, discussed above, which is funded by the Heritage Lottery Fund).  An 
alternative approach is for partners to establish a new body jointly.  This effectively pools the 
property rights and creates a new, independent residual claimant.  This latter arrangement will offer 
a considerably more secure prospect for the long term sustainability of the initiative, provided that it 
has adequate resources to cover the necessary costs.  However, it will also require a high degree of 
commitment on the parts of the individual partners to be willing to give up control and assets in this 
way.  In the short term, funding (or hopes of funding) can bring diverse partners together, but it 
remains to be seen under what circumstances such arrangements can outlast single project cycles.  
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In practice though most partnerships operate on informal arrangements and few have established 
formal institutional arrangements. 
 
5.3 Establishment of public trust 
 
An important item on an agenda for the discussion of appropriate institutions for rural land 
conservation land management is the question of how oversight is given to ensure that the duties 
and responsibilities of ownership are adhered to.  This applies whether land resources are held 
publicly or privately, or in some hybrid arrangement.  Transfer of public assets to private interests 
clearly raises the issue as to how the public interest in the management of those assets should be 
maintained.  But the parallel concern for the willingness of governments to engage in long term 
conservation leaves the same question for assets in government ownership, as concluded by the 
Independent Panel on Forestry.  And the introduction of regulations over private property, 
diminishing the power of freehold ownership doesn’t avoid this element.  Rights in land are not 
necessarily extinguished when they are removed from private owners.  Rather they may be seen as 
being transferred to the state which then has a duty of enforcement.   
 
The principle of the Public Trust Doctrine is much debated in United States law.  The precise origins 
of the doctrine are obscure, some argue that it goes back to Roman law, and more immediately that 
its has been inherited from English common law (Blumm, 2010).  The Public Trust Doctrine asserts 
that certain resources are held for public benefit and that the government has a duty to protect 
them for public use.  As expressed by Sagarin and Turnipseed (2012 p. 474) “certain natural 
resources cannot be subject to private ownership and must be held in trust for the people of a State 
(or US state) by the government”.   One interpretation is that the Doctrine divides property into two 
distinct estates res publicum and res privatum.  Some rights can be transferred and held privately, 
but others remain in the public realm for public benefit (Blumm, 2010 a).  The Doctrine has been 
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upheld in American courts since the 19th century with regard to specific resources, particularly 
relating to fishing, commerce and navigation uses of water and ownership of foreshore and riparian 
land (Araiza, 2011-12) and its application has widened over time (Blumm, 2010b).  Its adoption has 
varied from State to State; while some give it little prominence, the Pennsylvania Constitution, as 
amended in 1971, reads: “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all 
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth 
shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people”.v  However, it has not been 
applied consistently in the courts in the way that its advocates would wish (Takacs, 2008).  The 
doctrine has also been applied by the courts in other countries, such as in India and South Africa 
(Takacs, 2008). 
 
It has also been argued that the principle should have a broader interpretation to the conservation 
of land and natural resources more generally.  Sax (1970) in reviewing public trusts cases recognised 
that coverage had been rather narrow, However, he concluded that the same public trust 
protections could be equally applicable in controversies where a diffuse public interest needs 
protection from tightly organised groups with clear and immediate goals, such as in controversies 
involving air pollution, pesticides, location of rights of way, or draining wetlands.  It is thus argued 
that the public trust doctrine can provide the basis for common law environmental regulation 
“structuring the relationship among natural resources, the current and future citizens who own 
these resources, and the governments they elect to manage them” (Turnipseed, et al., 2010 p. 13).  
More particularly, the doctrine has been argued to have potential to apply to a variety of 
environmental issues from the management of beaches and parklands (Keith, 2010) to guidance as 
to the way in which government should regulate for climate change (Peloso and Caldwell, 2011).  
Similar arguments are also made at a global scale with regard to international law asserting that 
sovereign rights of nation states are limited by a parallel transnational duty for environmental 
stewardship as embodied for instance in the World Heritage Convention (Sand, 2004). 
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There is a clear sense of this public trusteeship inherent in the recommendations of the Independent 
Panel on Forestry (2012) for the property to be held in trust bytrusteeship of a Board of ‘Guardians’ 
who are accountable directly to Parliament.  This type of arrangement might be argued to create a 
somewhat different type of property, neither quite private nor public as commonly understood, 
where the state retains some residual legal interest that provides for the public good.  This thus 
echoes some interpretations of Public Trust Doctrine in the United States.  The Board will include 
representation from the major stakeholders, in effect acting as the representatives of the settlers of 
the trust who have contributed the land of the estate to the trust.  Stakeholders would particularly 
represent those groups benefiting from the non-market benefits as these are likely to outweigh the 
market benefits.  The Board would also represent the interests of future generations and wider 
environmental and social interests.  The Board would act to guarantee that the PFE meets national 
and international environmental commitments, achieves high management standards and maintains 
public accountability requirements.  If this is deemed not to be possible within available resources it 
would need either to make the case for extra funds from government or else to adjust the 
management or objectives of the forest activities.  This could clearly be a source of tension between 
the Guardians and the sponsoring government department. 
 
A parallel question arises in the context of the LCAs as to what general oversight should be 
implemented over the activities of the landholders.  While general government oversight is 
important, for example in terms of meeting national Biodiversity Action Plan targets, the key issue 
here is more likely to relate to the role of government in supporting and sustaining landholders’ 
activities and this will rely substantially on the availability of consistent public funding.  At present, 
there is a substantial reliance on access to funds made available through European agri-environment 
mechanisms.  But these are not primarily designed for the support of these types of initiative and 
their availability is subject to conditions required in the Rural Development Programme and to 
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future decisions as to the reforms of the CAP, that cannot be relied on to maintain the same level of 
provision into the future (Hodge and Adams, 2013b).   
 
This also raises a question as to the role of the state in support of conservation values across private 
land more widely.  A possible general application to private property raises a variety of difficult 
questions, such as who has standing to take enforcement action or who defines the public interest in 
balancing public and private interests?  A comparison may be made with the recent changes to 
development decisions in statutory land use planning where, under the new National Planning Policy 
Framework (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2012) the criterion for decisions 
on planning applications will be the promotion of sustainable development.  It may be expected that 
this will lead to legal challenge as to how this abstract concept may be interpreted within the 
context of particular development proposals (Samuels, 2013).  It is of course, one thing to propose 
that Parliamentary oversight may be developed from an initial starting point where the land is 
already in public ownership, but quite another to argue that this offers a model for a stronger role 
for the public interest on private property generally.  It may, though, offer an area for further 
consideration and debate.  Property is not a static concept; it evolves and develops in response to 
changing social and economic conditions.  But this takes us beyond the scope of this paper (e.g. 
Freyfogle, 2010).  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Neoliberalism has been a powerful force transforming the governance of rural landresources for the 
delivery of ecosystem services  in many countries, and certainly in the UK.  Neoliberalism 
undoubtedly presents new risks and challenges to the maintenance of public interests in the 
countryside, especially in times of recession and fiscal shortfall.  It may also, however, offer new 
opportunities and open up the possibility of novel institutional arrangements for the realization of 
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public goals in a substantially private landscape.  In this paper were have explored institutional 
arrangements for achieving public objectives for the delivery of ecosystems services outcomes in 
forestry and conservation.  Neoliberal approaches enable novel institutional forms that can give non-
profit and public bodies new ways of influencing private land uses.   
 
Our perspective of post-neoliberalism is similar in some respects to Foucault’s characterisation of 
neoliberal governmentality and its application to environment (e.g. Rutherford, 2007), where the 
state plays an active role in constructing and maintaining markets through diverse forms of 
governance within which actors pursue their own self interest (Fletcher, 2010).  This contrasts with 
Harvey’s (2005) argument that the neoliberal state regulates in order to address the ravages of 
neoliberal policy.  But we would argue that post-neoliberalism goes further.  In our case studies of 
rural land conservation, the state is intervening in support of non-profit organisations whose goal is 
to promote broader non-monetary ecosystem services rather than in support of individuals and 
firms to promote their personal utility or private profit.  Interestingly, this has arisen not through 
intended government policy; the Coalition government still maintains a relentless and dogmatic 
pursuit of economic growth.  Rather, in these particular cases, the public policy approach has been 
forced on the government through actions and pressures emerging in civil society.  The reversal of 
policy towards the Public Forest Estate arose from the public backlash against the proposals for 
forest land sales and the subsequent recommendations of the Independent Panel on Forestry.  The 
approach towards Large scale Conservation Areas had already been mapped out by conservation 
NGOs with government following behind in their wake.  The emergence of the post-neoliberal 
approach in these examples is then a reflection of public disquiet with the further neoliberalisation 
of rural land rather than a planned reversal of government ideology. The issue then is whether such 
public pressures will generate more general shifts in the orientations of public policy. 
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New mechanisms, such as conservation covenants, blending property rights across different 
ownerships, have the potential to support conservation objectives by extending the reach of 
conservation organisations in order to co-ordinate land use and management at a larger scale.  
These arrangement allow new actors to influence and become directly engaged in rural land 
conservation.  These new actors bring a range of motivations and capabilities and as aAlternative 
residual claimants they have different objectives.  Where they hold objectives that are close to the 
policy objectives of government, this effectively internalises external costs and benefits and sets 
incentives for cost-effective delivery of public goods.  More information is needed about the 
experience of the operation of conservation owners and collective organisations in practice in terms 
of the organisational approaches adopted, objectives selected and decision-making processes.  
Under public or private ownership there remains a role for public oversight of land uses and 
conservation in order to promote and secure wider public interests.  The arrangements proposed for 
oversight over the Public Forest Estate may be seen as introducing a novel form of property not 
private and not held by government.  It will be important to assess the development of this 
approach and its potential relevance in other contexts.  This question has parallels with the debates 
in the United States over the Public Trust Doctrine and raises more general questions as to the 
state’s responsibility for oversight of private land management more generally.  The public interest 
in LCAs will also depend on a sustainable institutional governance and sources of funding.  While 
funds will be unlikely to be fully provided by government, government will need to promote 
institutional arrangements that support access to stable sources of funds without unreasonable 
transactions costs.  It is clear that considerable institutional diversity and potential exists, particularly 
through the work of conservation trusts – perhaps more than some commentators would see under 
the influence of neoliberalism.  This also requires the active engagement of government in a variety 
of ways   
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However, these observations raise a number of questions.  First, there is clearly a need for grounded 
case studies of the institutional frameworks of projects that seek to combine landowners and other 
actors within a specified area to promote shared outcomes in terms of land.  The devil, as ever, is 
likely to reside in the details.  Second, there are questions about the acceptability of these kinds of 
institutional arrangements to wider society.  A number of large conservation areas have been 
launched on a flood of local goodwill, just as the attempt to sell of government forests was opposed 
by a rising tide of web-based democratic energy.  However, controls on land usage have the 
potential to affect rural people and communities, and those in cities, in many ways.  There is the 
potential for losers and well as winners from innovative large scale management of land for nature 
or forestry.  Keeping the enthusiasm of early supporters is important.  There is a clear research need 
to understand what conditions favour creation of the social and financial capital that can enable 
initiatives to endure.  Third, the sustainability of different institutional arrangements remains to be 
proven.  How can public interests be secured in an uncertain economic future?  Governments can 
sell off holdings, and quasi-private owners can become bankrupt. 
 
There is thus much to be done to make use of the institutional opportunities that have been opened 
up through the neoliberal approach.  This will require a more active state in collaboration with non-
profit and other private interests to explore a post-neoliberal agenda. 
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